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Chapter 6: Strindberg’s Open Sea:
The Conflation of Science and Suffering 
If it form the one landscape that we inconstant ones 
Are consistently homesick for, this is chiefly  
Because it dissolves in water.1
The skerries of Stockholm’s archipelago have a harsh beauty and were a 
point of fascination for August Strindberg.2 Like W. H. Auden’s depiction 
of his limestone landscape, these sparsely populated islands served as a 
location where Strindberg explored the relationship between description 
and subjectivity. As Auden implies, these descriptions are born from the 
longing for a home and as such, are quintessentially modern. In Praise of 
Limestone suggests that we create the illusion of permanent formations 
while it is really the ocean’s incessant ebb and flow that carves and shapes 
regions that are truly transient. And »… [t]he poet,/Admired for his ear-
nest habit of calling/The sun the sun […],« is made uneasy by the appar-
ently solid shape assumed by the limestone. He rebels against this 
apparent conceit, which goes against the grain of his »antimythological 
myth«.3 However, this poet who doubts the very substance of the illusion 
that he carves out of his incessant desire, his longing and his exile, real-
izes that when he tries »to imagine a faultless love/Or the life to come, 
what I hear is the murmur/Of underground streams, what I see is the 
limestone landscape.«4
In Praise of Limestone reminds us that our aspirations and our dream-
like projections inspire form, and that every description momentarily 
arrests the flow of a landscape’s history. Perhaps the poet becomes aware 
of the streaming of time within him and shapes it as an impassioned re-
creation of desire through naming and through description. Perhaps he 
describes »things« by imposing the mark of being upon the landscape of 
becoming. And yet, Auden’s »antimythological« mythmaker keeps alive 
the tension between the ocean, which dissolves the form, and the form 
————
1  AUDEN: 1989, 184, In Praise of Limestone.
2  Strindberg wrote short stories, poems, novels, and plays set in the Stockholm archi-
pelago.
3  Ibid., 186.
4  Ibid., 187.
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itself. It could be that this is what Nietzsche means when he tells us of 
the »hermit’s’« secret imperative that: 
… dieser würdige Wort-Prunk zu dem alten Lügen-Putz, -Plunder und -Gold-
staub der unbewussten menschlichen Eitelkeit gehört, und das auch unter sol-
cher schmeichlerischen Farbe und Übermalung der schreckliche Grundtext 
homo natura wieder heraus erkannt werden muss. 
(… this dignified verbal pageantry belongs among the false old finery, debris, 
and gold dust of unconscious human vanity, and that the terrible basic text of 
homo natura must be recognized even underneath these fawning and painted 
surfaces.)5
Nietzsche’s comment addresses what he calls a »Grundwillen des Geistes« 
(fundamental will of the spirit), which attempts to »in sich und um sich 
herum Herr sein« (dominate itself and its surroundings) by means of an 
appropriation of the unknown.6 According to him, the spirit enjoys the 
use of masks and artifice in order to increase its own feeling of power, 
and accomplishes this sense of its own surfeit by indulging in the protean 
display of a rich vocabulary of appearance. Nietzsche claims that all this 
has served to furnish humans with the illusions of »höhere Cultur« 
(higher culture),7 and with the feeling of being »mehr« (more), »höher« 
(higher) and of »anderer Herkunft« (a different origin).8 This higher cul-
ture, however, despite its fear of the »wilden grausamen Thiere« (cruel 
and wild beast) creates and replicates its form through »selbst gewende-
ten Grausamkeit« (self-directed cruelty).9 In this vein, Nietzsche goes so 
far as to describe the »Erkennende« (knower) as »Künstler und Verklärer 
der Grausamkeit« ([an] artist of cruelty and the agent of its transfigura-
tion).10 And so, if knowledge is a means of redirecting internalized cruelty 
(read ressentiment), this hermitic philosopher, who stands beyond »good 
and evil,« has a task. His charge is to: 
Zurück-übersetzen in die Natur; über die vielen eitlen und schwärmerischen 
Deutungen und Nebensinne Herr werden, welche bisher über jenen ewigen 
————
5  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 169 (Jenseits von Gut und Böse), Aphorism 230. The 
English is from NORMAN: 2002, 124.
6  Ibid., 167, (121 for the English) 
7  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 166, Aphorism 229. NORMAN: 2002, 120 for the English. 
8  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 169, Aphorism 230 (NORMAN: 2002, 123 for the English). 
9  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 165–166, Aphorism 229 (NORMAN: 2002, 120–121, for the 
English).
10  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 167, Aphorism 229 (NORMAN: 2002, 121, for the English). 
THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN STRINDBERG AND NIETZSCHE216
Grundtext homo natura gekritzelt und gemalt wurden; machen, dass der 
Mensch fürderhin vor dem Menschen steht, wie er heute schon, hart geworden 
in der Zucht der Wissenschaft, vor der anderen Natur steht … 
(Translate humanity back into nature; to gain control of the many vain and 
fanciful interpretations and incidental meanings that have been scribbled and 
drawn over the eternal basic text of homo natura so far; to make sure that, 
from now on, the human being will stand before the human being, just as he 
already stands before the rest of nature today, hardened by the discipline of 
science …)«11
To accomplish this undertaking, Nietzsche explains, one must ignore the 
calls of the metaphysicians and their siren song of unchanging form. One 
must become like Auden’s »antimythological mythmaker« of a poet, and 
like Strindberg’s grand naturalist; one should call things by their proper
names.
 Nietzsche insists that there is a relationship between knowledge and 
cruelty, and that the translation of the human back to nature does not 
mean a return to a »natural« man free from cultural mediation. There is 
an appropriative and an aesthetic reconfiguration to this process as nam-
ing allows the eternal oscillation between proximate and distant forms to 
settle temporarily into a »secret system of caves and conduits,«12 for at 
least a moment. As Mark Warren reminds us: »If the Dionysian pathos of 
embodiment – what Nietzsche calls ›nature‹ – is a deep and multifaceted 
resource and ground of human life, it is intelligible only through our 
interpretative and material appropriations of it. Because ›nature‹ consists 
only in the flux and multiplicity of raw experience, it has no humanly 
intelligible qualities.«13 Translation into nature implies an active sover-
eign, creating his or her perspective towards the world through descrip-
tion. These descriptions flow out of the larger pool, which is a conflation 
of science and suffering. 
 This conflation is where Nietzsche’s commonality with Strindberg 
becomes apparent. Despite Knut Hamsun’s characterization of him as a 
writer who depicted culture as a degenerated nature, Strindberg occupies 
a much more complex position than such a romantic view would allow. 
This position is not a binary opposition between nature and culture, a 
simple matter of Strindberg emerging from Rousseau’s shadow and enter-
————
11  NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 169, Aphorism 230. NORMAN: 2002, 123 for the English. 
12  AUDEN: 1989, 184.
13  WARREN: 1988, 48.
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ing a Nietzschean phase.14 Strindberg faces nature and forms a dynamic 
interpretative relationship with her. A few years before he encountered 
Nietzsche, Strindberg explicated his stance towards the cultural, stating 
that it »är alltså icke kulturen jag angriper utan överkulturen. Vi ha blivit 
för fina, därför är råheten ett symptom av den sunda återgången. Det är 
fint att ljuga och rått att säga sin mening. Låtom oss uppfostra oss till 
mera råhet.« (is accordingly not culture that I attack but high culture. We 
have become too refined; consequently brutality is a symptom of the 
healthy retrogression. It is refined to lie and brutal to say one’s piece. Let 
us educate ourselves to be more brutal).15 It becomes apparent Strind-
berg’s hostility was not directed towards culture per se; his critique was 
directed towards what he regarded to be a culture that had sublimated its 
ressentiment and created a nexus of lies. If we recall that we let Strind-
berg articulate his own understanding of naturalism in the excursus that 
follows the first chapter of this study and that he claimed that naturalists 
resist the artificial, »love to name« and thereby define their own cause, 
we can understand that Strindberg is arguing that the naturalist’s belief in 
the primacy of a social contract honestly conceived is not simply a return 
to nature, and that he thereby assumes a position that lies somewhere in 
between Rousseau’s notion of social contract and a Nietzschean transla-
tion back into nature. Once again the issue of naming something and 
determining its standing within a constellation of things that make up any 
collective sense of »reality« comes to the fore. With this in mind let us 
return to the skerries with Strindberg, where »Solrök« (Haze), a prose 
poem from »Högsommar« (High Summer) section of Dikter på vers och 
prosa (Poems in Verse and Prose) written in 1883 and »Solnedgång på 
havet« (Sundown at Sea) from the section entitled »Stormar« (Storms) 
from the same collection are set.16
The Swimmer 
»Haze,«17 a prose poem, opens with a description of a family’s objects 
being transported by ship. The passengers are leaving the city for the 
————
14  See Keith ANSELL-PEARSON’s excellent book, Nietzsche contra Rousseau (1991).
15  STRINDBERG: 1990, 12. Utopia i verkligheten was originally published in 1885. My 
translation.
16  STRINDBERG: 1995, 9–156.
17  »Solrök«. The poem appears in ibid., 77–87.
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Stockholm archipelago and the narration is in the third person. The pro-
tagonist notices a shift in his perspective. He catches sight of someone he 
knows and remarks: »Nej, man ser varann aldrig så här i stan, man har så 
mycket att göra.« (No, people never see each other like this in the city. 
One has so much to do.)18 Not only does the journey change the angle of 
the narrator’s vision, but the destination exerts an influence as well due 
to »naturens evigt föryngrande makt« (nature’s eternal power of rejuve-
nation)!19 However, as the narrative continues, this change in perception 
will prove to be misleading. The protagonist will find that a return to an 
unadulterated nature is not possible for him, and that nature herself does 
not transform things; his journey to the archipelago merely highlights the 
relationship between his own past and the desire to translate himself 
back into nature. In other words, he will see how the traces of an emer-
gent subjectivity, whose perspective manifests in description, leaves an 
imprint on the very nature to which he longs to return. Man translated 
back into nature unfortunately transcribes the natural in human terms. 
 The protagonist has left the city, but traces of it remain. He has 
brought his things with him, and the city resides in his mind as a re-
pressed element. Plagued by »mörka drömmar: han pressas mellan husen 
i trånga svarta gränder« (dark dreams: he is pressed between houses in 
narrow, black alleys).20 He dreams that he is confined in a well, and is 
roused by some knocking on the windowpane. He awakes, looks out of 
the window and exclaims: »O natur! Verkligheten som övergår alla 
drömmar. Ser du, drömmare, sådant har din hjärna aldrig kunnat dröm-
ma ihop och du pratar om den kalla verkligheten.« (O’ nature! Reality 
that surpasses every dream. See, you dreamer, your brain could never 
have dreamt up anything such as this, and you talk about cold reality.)21
He creates an opposition between the magnificence of nature and the 
limitations of the mind, between »reality« and its mediation through 
thought.
 An equivalency has been posited: to claim knowledge of »reality« is to 
dream. Yet there is a paradox built into this equation as well. Here, the 
limits of an individual’s perspective are delimited by an intimation of that 
————
18  Ibid., 78. My translation.
19  Ibid.  
20  Ibid. My translation.  
21  Ibid., 78–79. My translation.
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which exceeds the ability of the individual to formulate and conceive. 
The protagonist knows his perspective through the nocturnal whispering 
of that which lies outside of it, »reality, or nature«. In a play on the notion 
of the sublime, the »realist« who claims to be able to grasp »reality« is 
proven wrong by a realization that something essential exists and that it 
remains outside of his reach. Nature is postulated to be the text that lies 
beyond the realm of interpretation, yet it is asserted to be legible as a 
phenomenon beyond individual comprehension. An opposition is estab-
lished between that which can be described and that which is beyond 
description. Nature is described absolutely as that which cannot be de-
scribed at all. The protagonist walks to the ocean and this opposition 
emerges in sharper relief: 
Av med kläderna och ner i djupet. Vad han såg där nere på en sekund? En 
annan värld, där träden voro röda som tång och luften smaragdgrön som 
havets vatten; och så är han uppe igen mitt bland de sorlande och kämpande 
vågorna; och han brottas med dem tills han blir trött och lägger sig att vila på 
deras ryggar; och de kastar honom upp, som de ville vräka honom ner i mörka 
dalgångar som om de ville suga honom ner i avgrunden; han upphör att vilja, 
han upphör att önska, han gör intet motstånd; hans kropp har förlorat sin 
tyngd, han står icke under inflytande av gravitationslagarne, han svävar mellan 
vatten och luft – det är den absoluta vilan utan förnimmelser 
(Off with his clothing and down into the deep. What did he see down there in 
a second? Another world, where the trees were red as seaweed and the air em-
erald green like the ocean’s water; and then he is forced to the surface again 
into the midst of the rippling and battling waves; and he wrestles with them 
until he becomes tired and lays himself to rest on their backs, and they toss 
him up, as if they want to cast him down into dark valleys, as if they wanted to 
suck him into the abyss; he ceases to will, he ceases to wish, he gives no resis-
tance; his body has lost its weight, he is no longer under the influence of the 
laws of gravity, he hovers between the water and the sky – this is the absolute 
repose without perception.)22
There are several stages to this encounter between swimmer and ocean 
and these moments show that for Strindberg, the beyond of nature is not 
merely Kant’s Ding an sich, a mere structure of the conditions of possi-
bility for apperception. The encounter occurs at the site of collision be-
tween aspects of self; it constructs a paradigm of incommensurability. 
This is the moment where the comparison of the like and the unlike cre-
ate metaphor. 
————
22  Ibid., 80–81. My translation.  
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 The swimmer takes off his clothes and dives into the ocean naked. He 
experiences a glimpse of another world, which he describes ironically, 
using comparisons from the landscape, the world in which he enjoys 
familiarity. This description is ironic because it simultaneously feigns 
ignorance and yet it bears the conceit of knowledge. This irony serves as 
a deconstruction of the paradox of the sublime, claiming that nature can 
be experienced as an absolute beyond description and yet it can still be 
described. The rhetorical strategy of this deconstruction is played out in 
the citation above as the poet names the characteristics of the ocean as 
another world, and then he names the features of the oceanscape as land 
forms. He does this while simultaneously attributing these nouns with 
adjectives that are descriptions of the very same ocean he had claimed to 
misrecognize. This is performed in a comparison, a simile. It was as if the 
poet were saying: naming is not reality, it is a comparison between the 
like and the unlike, an attribute of the perceptual misrecognition and 
the subsequent forgetting of this misrecognition through description, 
through renaming. It is as if he were saying that words obscure the 
perceiver’s distance from »reality« through the ironic movement from 
distance to proximity in description. 
 Furthermore, the experience of the swimmer is parallel to his dream, 
except this time he is not driven down into the valleys of streets and al-
leys, but into their marine equivalent. He is not restricted by the barriers 
of a well, but by the limits of his own ability to describe a force more 
powerful than he is. The confinement of the cityscape re-emerges as the 
borders of his conscious mind. The description of the ocean is followed 
by a cessation of struggle, as the swimmer surrenders his body to the 
power of the ocean. He hovers between the water and the air; standing in 
for the horizon, inhabiting a liminal space that defines difference. The 
fury of the ocean leads him to a state of absolute repose without percep-
tion. In other words, while he is caught by a force that dissolves the dif-
ferentiation between subject and object, he inhabits the space that 
delimits. His very presence in nature, immersed in it at this moment, is 
rendered liminal by his desire to interpret. This passage explicates the 
irony of description and as such rejects any identification of the experi-
ence of nature as the experience of the sublime. 
 The swimmer’s passage suggests that the shedding of the superficial 
aspect of civilization, clothing, does not result in the merger with nature. 
Human beings are incapable of this union. The ocean’s landscape is de-
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scribed in terms of a movement, as the narrator names the unfamiliar in 
the terms of what is familiar, and then he modifies the object through a 
comparison of the unfamiliar with »itself«. The mechanism works like 
this: The seaweed is called a tree that has the color of seaweed. The name 
of the unfamiliar is known, but it is described in a simile that plays on the 
act of familiarizing a perception through description, then defamiliarizing 
this description by calling a thing by its common name. In this way the 
struggle between new and familiar metaphors is highlighted. His descrip-
tion is neither objective nor is it subjective; it is adjective.23
 The swimmer’s passage can be read as a representation of the problem 
of description, as a dramatization of the dynamic of distance and prox-
imity. He nakedly struggles with the natural force of the ocean; he tries to 
describe it, and his energy is sapped. He is enervated by the effort. After 
he loses his ability to resist, his experience runs parallel to a dream, as 
associations seem to come of their own accord. His body loses its weight; 
willing ceases as he seemingly merges with his environment. This is an 
illusion however; this species of merger is impossible. The natural force 
forces him into a liminal position; he acts as a border as even his weight-
less body assumes the position of a horizon. He senses an absolute will, 
but is unable to describe it, as there is no discernible object to perceive. 
Despite these Schopenhauerian overtones, the salient issue is not a mat-
ter of willing and representation; it is a matter of positioning and perspec-
tive. For the swimmer, description ceases at a point of absolute 
proximity; it is dependent on the relationship between distance and 
comparison. However, fidelity to experience depends on immersion, 
proximity. But a merger with nature is impossible and the narrator is 
washed up on shore where then he proceeds to describe a shipwreck in 
verse.
 The shipwreck is not an incidental detail, but serves as a parallel phe-
nomenon to the experience of the swimmer. The ocean as a representa-
tion of generalized will rejects the body of one who attempts to merge 
with it through the particularity of description.24 Description particular-
izes the human as well, creating a sense of subjectivity and perspective. 
————
23  The prefix »ad-« meaning either a moving towards or an adding to. I utilize this 
prefix in both of these senses. 
24  An interesting moment inflected perhaps by Strindberg’s »favorite philosopher,« 
Schopenhauer.
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Yet, the attempt to describe »reality« is enervating. Total immersion, 
absolute fidelity to experience is impossible. The discernible »reality« of 
the ocean for the swimmer is an ironic interpretation dependent on an 
appropriation through naming and the resistance of the text of experience 
to the name. Complete fidelity, total immersion obscures the position of 
the one who describes; the »will« as generalized force moves him back to 
his »proper« position as a particular and sentient being. He becomes the 
boundary marker, the personification of the delineation between identifi-
cation through naming and difference. It is as if the poet were saying that 
human beings do not reside within the realm of the authentic, but exist as 
a delimitation of experience through interpretation. The will of the indi-
vidual is a directed will, an interpreting will, a will that changes the object 
of its description through appropriation.25
 After the description of the shipwreck in verse, the text returns to a 
prose narrative. Later, »the swimmer« wants to be alone with nature. He 
travels out to an islet that »ser mera ofördärvad ut än de andra holmar-
ne« (appears less defiled than the other islands).26 He sets sail for the islet 
and lands to find »sin dröm förverkligad« (his dream made real).27 Again, 
there is a contradiction as the poet has already stated that reality was 
beyond the swimmer’s ability to dream. He believes that he has found 
»ensamheten, naturen« (solitude, nature)!28 He dreams of being alone 
with nature and he equates nature with solitude seemingly believing that 
he could lose himself and his relationships in its midst. He espies a house 
sparrow, »rännstenens och bakgårdens grannar« (the gutter and backyard’s 
neighbor), and he asks, »Vad levde han då av härute där människan icke 
fanns« (What did he live on out here where people were not to be 
found)?29 He walks on and finds the sole of a shoe. Suddenly his descrip-
tion of the landscape metamorphoses from a depiction of a paradisiacal 
idyll to a catalogue of the signs of waste and abandonment. He had found 
the remains of a quarry in the middle of paradise. Men had come and 
taken what they could use and then had left ruins as a trace. The swimmer 
is appalled: 
————
25  And here the moment becomes a bit more »Nietzschean«. 
26  STRINDBERG: 1995, 83.
27  Ibid., 84.
28  Ibid.  
29  Ibid., 85.
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Han flydde ifrån förödelsen och styrde sina steg ner till båten. – Fotspår i 
sanden! Han bannade och ville fly, men då märkte han att han bannade sig 
själv och då förstod han varför måsarne flydde och huggormen och de andra, 
och han trampade igen i sina spår, ty han kunde icke fly sig själv 
(He fled the scene of destruction and steered his steps towards the boat. Foot-
prints in the sand! He cursed and wanted to flee, but then he noticed that he 
had only cursed himself, and then he understood why the gulls, and the 
snakes, and the others had fled; and he retraced his footprints for he couldn’t 
escape himself.)30
The trace of the destroyer was a trace of himself. He who had criticized 
and described the transformation of nature from idyll to raw material 
now realized that he was the same as those who came to exploit what 
nature had to give. There is no direct escape from human exploitation to 
an Arcadian landscape as the swimmer had left his trace on the landscape 
as well by virtue of his presence, his description. In the end, he is incapa-
ble of experiencing that »reality« that resided beyond his dream state. 
The imprint of the interpreter has indelibly marked the landscape. The 
very notion of Arcadia itself destroys Arcadia. 
 The swimmer then »tog sin kikare och riktade den åter över fjärden 
varifrån han kommit« (took up his binoculars and directed them once 
again towards the bay over which he had come).31 His gaze drifts across 
the water towards his vacation house and his family. His excursion into 
nature and his subsequent attempts to differentiate between that which is 
natural and that which results from human cultural activity had failed. He 
learned that his critique of the exploitation of nature was contingent 
upon the realization that his own footsteps were the cause of his despair. 
His description of nature was a text in which he forgot to account for his 
own intrusion upon that which is natural. It was as if he had realized that 
to describe the natural is to change it through the infusion of the 
namer in the named.32 All he could describe was his own intrusion and 
his longing for a purity that is unattainable. It was as if he had learned 
that his mistake was the same as the misreading that Nietzsche attributed 
to »bad Philologists«. The text of nature was inaccessible; all that could 
be seen were the footsteps, the traces of an interpretation, and despite a 
desire to escape, the swimmer returns to his own past. »If it form the one 
————
30  Ibid.
31  Ibid., 86.
32  Does the germ of Expressionism reside in this gesture?
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landscape that we inconstant ones/Are consistently homesick for, this is 
chiefly/Because it dissolves in water …« 
The Exile and his Metaphors 
With this in mind, we turn to a poem written in 1883, »Solnedgång på 
havet« (Sundown at Sea). In »Haze,« a description of the ocean raised 
the issue of the possibility of the description of natural elements. I con-
cluded that the depiction of the swimmer raised issues of liminality for 
the human, and an oscillation from that position of acting as a horizon 
highlighted the problem of depiction. The components of this problem 
are further illustrated in »Sundown at Sea«. The poem reads as follows: 
Jag ligger på kabelgattet 
Rökande »Fem blå bröder« 
och tänker på intet.  
Havet är grönt 
så dunkelt absintgrönt; 
Det är bittert som klormagnesium 
Och saltare än klornatrium; 
Det är kyskt som jodkalium; 
Och glömska, glömska 
Av stora synder och stora sorger 
Det ger endast havet, 
Och absint! 
O du gröna absinthav, 
O du stilla absintglömska, 
Döva mina sinnen 
Och låt mig somna i ro 
Som förr jag sömnade 
Över en artikel i 
Revue des deux Mondes! 
Sverige ligger som en rök 
Som röken av en Maduro-Havanna, 
Och solen sitter däröver 
Som en halvsläckt cigarr. 
Men runt kring horisonten 
Stå brotten så röda 
Som bengaliska eldar 
Och lysa på eländet 
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(I stand by the Hawser hole 
smoking five »blue brothers« 
and think about nothing. 
The sea is green 
so dark absinth-green;  
it is bitter like magnesium-chloride 
and saltier than sodium-chloride 
it is chaste like potassium-iodide; 
and forgetfulness, forgetfulness
of great sins and sorrows 
is granted only by the sea
and absinth! 
Oh you green absinth-sea,  
oh you tranquil absinth-oblivion, 
dull my senses 
and let me sleep in peace, 
as before I had slept 
over an article in 
Revue des deux Mondes! 
Sweden lies like smoke, 
like the smoke of a Maduro-Havanna 
and the sun sits over there 
like a half-extinguished cigar, 
but around by the horizon 
sit the cliffs as red/as Bengali fire 
and shines down on the misery.) 33
»Sundown at Sea« builds a metaphorical complex around the figure of 
the ocean in order to illustrate a philosophical problem. The descriptive 
aspects of this poem are in collision as a tension between the will to 
name and the desire to forget prevails. The metaphorical core of this 
poem builds up through a process in which simile is transformed into 
metaphor. In other words, the resemblance or likeness between two 
things commutes to substitution of one thing for another. This movement 
depicts the very same phenomena faced by the narrator of »Haze« as he 
realized that he inhabited a liminal position from which he could never 
merge with the ocean, but from which he could only oscillate between 
positions of proximity and positions of distance. For the poet, nature 
herself could never be more than an interpretation, a valuation in the 
form of description. 
————
33  STRINDBERG: 1995, 125–126. Translation mine. 
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  »Sundown at Sea« opens with the poetic »I« standing on the deck of 
a ship and thinking about nothing. He has no object which he could 
describe until he turns his attention to the ocean. Unlike the swimmer, he 
does not immerse himself in the water, but stands at a distance. He is not 
subject to the ocean’s power and his will is not suspended. His first de-
scription of the ocean stutters as he directly describes the ocean’s green-
ness and then modifies and intensifies his description by calling it the 
dark green of absinthe, the color of intoxication. He continues his de-
scription and the poem takes a strange turn, as an almost exaggeratedly 
programmatic naturalist rendering comes to the fore. The ocean is now 
»bitter as magnesium chloride/and saltier than sodium-chloride«. The 
natural object of description is broken down into its component parts 
and the use of scientific language, a manifestation of cultural mastery 
through naming, connotes an attempt to subjugate the natural to the 
cultural. However, in the very next line another, subtle change manifests. 
The sea becomes »chaste like potassium-iodide,« and scientific naming is 
infused with a human quality: kyskhet or chastity. This simile fuses scien-
tific naming and human behavior. The trace of the describer’s footsteps is 
again discernible. Scientific nomenclature is used to create similes. The 
scientific name and the natural object it describes are separated and 
compared, they hold likeness in common but this commonality shows 
itself to be unstable, held together by the fabric of the observer’s distance. 
He stands on the deck of a conveyance that allows him the illusion of 
being in a sea of becoming. The ocean, which has the color of intoxica-
tion is confronted by an attempt to master it through scientific naming 
and thereby an attempt to enculturate nature. This attempt is complicated 
as a personification is juxtaposed to a scientific term infusing it with a 
human quality. This is the beginning of a merger of poet’s interpretation 
and the text of nature in the act of description. However, the attempt to 
objectify the ocean cannot withstand the intrusion of the poet’s own 
encroaching subjectivity. 
 The next four lines further efface the text of the ocean and a salient 
dynamic of description itself comes to the fore: »And forgetfulness, for-
getfulness/of great sins and great sorrows/is granted only by the ocean/ 
and absinth.« Suddenly the desire to forget is juxtaposed to the will to 
name. The poetic voice wishes to forget guilt feelings and suffering. The 
ocean is established as a locus for the juxtaposition of the will to intoxica-
tion, the will to name scientifically, and the slippage of the ability to mas-
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ter nature through scientific naming when this attempt to objectify is 
infused with a human quality (kyskhet). After that, the ocean is personi-
fied, and it becomes a source of forgetfulness and is compared to absinth, 
intoxication.
 In the next line the personification introduced in the attempt to encul-
turate nature is further radicalized as the poetic »I« addresses the ocean 
directly. »O you green absinth-ocean« (absinthav).34 Absinth or intoxica-
tion now merges with the ocean, which is now not merely the color of 
absinth, but becomes the drink. This is the first time that substitution 
emerges out of a series of comparisons. The ocean merges with the forget-
fulness of intoxication. The deck, the solid platform gliding across a rag-
ing sea and the site of an attempt to still the force of ever moving water by 
naming scientifically, has become the site of oblivion as forgetting ob-
scures a rationalized system of naming in the movement from comparison 
to substitution. The Dionysian aspect of this particular metaphorical 
series takes over. The metaphorical complex around the figure of the 
ocean in »Sundown at Sea« is the locus of two seemingly opposing im-
pulses: the desire to master through naming and the will to forget through 
intoxication. It becomes rather obvious here that my contention is that 
this opposition can be read as an aestheticized formulation of a philoso-
phical problematic with Nietzschean implications. 
 The obvious association is the Apollonian/Dionysian opposition in 
Der Geburt der Tragödie (The Birth of Tragedy). While one could cer-
tainly squeeze this poem into that rather tight shoe, this possibility is 
ruled out in favor of a development in Nietzsche’s thought that more 
explicitly treats the problematic of naming and forgetting. I am referring 
to the Nietzschean genealogies. As discussed in the fourth and fifth chap-
ter of this monograph, Nietzsche, in his genealogies, associated the right 
to name with the sovereign act of appropriation. He also posited that a 
willful forgetfulness was an essential aspect of a creative perspective. The 
inability to forget was conversely attributed to a perspective marked by a 
dyspeptic ressentiment and a sense of obedience to what he regarded as a 
dominant and unhealthy social order. As Sarah Kofman remarks in 
Nietzsche and Metaphor:
To make up for the forgetting of origins which it conceals, memory struggles 
against forgetting as an active life-force – against self-forgetting the other and 
————
34 My emphasis. 
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the past. It gives us the opportunity to take on the future and make promises; it 
gives us conscience, responsibility, personal identity. But these gratifications 
are merely a deception, for this violent process culminates in the triumph of 
the collective over the individual … The fundamental objective of memory is to 
make one forget difference and genesis at all costs: for to society each presents 
the risk of change, instability and insecurity … The objective of memory is to 
make us forget life.35
Kofman is arguing that, for Nietzsche, memory is the means by which the 
deception of individual identity is defined within the confines of a social 
structure. In other words, it is the means by which the collective assumes 
control over the individual by defining the concept of the self. Seen in 
this light, Nietzsche’s argument that an active forgetting is a vital compo-
nent of health is also a bid for release from the legacy of domination by 
the collective morality over the individual. 
 If we understand »Sundown at Sea« in light of »Haze« with its depic-
tion of the human suspended on the horizon as a liminal being who both 
changes the object of his description and is changed himself by perform-
ing this act adjectively, then the problematic aspects of description bear a 
close resemblance to the dynamic of the Nietzschean understanding of 
interpretation. Interpretation, in turn, is accompanied by the creation of a 
perspective, a species of self-interpretation through the delimitation of 
one’s angle of vision and the subsequent establishment of one’s horizon. 
Seen in the light of Nietzsche’s articulation of the problem, the desire to 
name scientifically is tantamount to an attempt to objectify and master a 
natural force from a distinctive perspective. For if the ocean is described 
as being like chemical compounds; it is broken down by naming and 
effaced as a natural force through the distance created by objectification. 
However, the tension between naming and forgetting in this poem leads 
to the construction of a metaphor. The metaphor emerges as the »gröna 
absinthav (green absinthsea),« a merger of intoxication and a natural 
force. As intoxication implies oblivion (»glömska, det ger endast havet 
och absint« [forgetfulness, is granted only by the ocean and absinth]), 
there is a merger between the will to forget and the intoxicating com-
pound of nature and the Dionysian. 
 What the poetic voice wishes to forget are »stora synder och stora 
sorger« (great sins and great sorrows). Sins and sorrows are connected: 
sin the moralized conception of transgressive behavior and sorrows, the 
————
35  KOFMAN: 1993, 47–48.
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internalization of pain. This is the hallmark of the Nietzschean concep-
tion of the ressentiment of the herd animal. The overcoming of this pain-
ful condition in which memory enslaves the individual is the creation of a 
metaphorical complex, which is an amalgam of exact naming and active 
forgetfulness. This is the Nietzschean formula for Selbstüberwindung.
 Nietzsche also treated this issue of naming and forgetfulness in the 
unpublished essay, Ueber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen 
Sinne, collected in his Nachgelassene Schriften and written in 1872.36
This essay informs us about the implications of metaphor production. 
Wir wissen immer noch nicht, woher der Trieb zur Wahrheit stammt, denn bis 
jetzt haben wir nur von der Verpflichtung gehört, die die Gesellschaft, um zu 
existiren stellt, wahrhaft zu sein, d. h. die usuellen Metaphern zu brauchen, al-
so moralisch ausgedrückt, von der Verpflichtung nach einer festen Convention 
zu lügen, schaarenweise in einem für alle verbindlichen Stile zu lügen. 
(We still do not yet know where the drive for truth comes from. For so far we 
have heard only of the duty which society imposes in order to exist: to be 
truthful means to employ the usual metaphors. Thus, to express it morally, this 
is to lie according to a fixed convention, to lie with the herd and in a manner 
binding upon everyone.)37
In this essay, Nietzsche argued that every concept is a comparison be-
tween that which a thing is and that which it is not (Gleichsetzen des 
Nicht-Gleichen).38 Therefore, he continues, a concept is created through 
a forgetting of the difference between individual things of the same 
»class« »durch ein Vergessen des Unterscheidenden« (through the forget-
ting of the distinctions).39 This process leads to another type of forgetting 
whereby: »den Menschen als Maass an alle Dinge zu halten, wobei er 
aber von dem Irrthume ausgeht, zu glauben, er habe diese Dinge unmit-
telbar als reine Objekte vor sich. Er vergisst also die originalen Anschau-
ungsmetaphern als Metaphern und nimmt sie als die Dinge selbst.« (His 
method is to treat man as the measure of all things, but in doing so he 
again proceeds from the error of believing he has these things [which he 
intends to measure] immediately before him as mere objects. He forgets 
that the original perceptual metaphors are metaphors and takes them to 
————
36  NIETZSCHE: 1988a, KSA 1, 874–890.
37  Ibid., 881. The English translation comes from BREAZEALE: 1999, 84.
38  NIETZSCHE: 1988a, KSA 1, 880.
39  Ibid. Translation: BREAZEALE: 1999, 84.
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be things themselves.)40 According to Nietzsche, scientific »truth« can be 
seen in the same light, as an order of naming that obscures its origins. For 
him, science creates categories from out of the observable world through 
the anthropomorphizing act of conceptualization that is ultimately based 
on metaphor.41 The problem, as Nietzsche saw it, is that the metaphors 
utilized by science are distinguished by an accompanying form of amne-
sia, a passive forgetting of the possibility of creating new metaphors. This 
is of course a one-sided critique, as science does have the ability to renew 
its representations of the world. This ability is exemplified by valorization 
of the notion of fallibility in scientific research. However, Nietzsche is 
forwarding a polemic here whose target is all absolute truth claims, and 
his main point remains of interest: acts of description arise through 
metaphor and description is a form of valuation; therefore all our val-
ues are not essential, they merely stand in for something else.
 However, even if absolute truth claims have obscured the origin of the 
concept as a species of metaphor, there are still aspects of human en-
deavor where one can find freedom from the rule of the ossified meta-
phor, »im Mythus und überhaupt in der Kunst« (in myth and in art
generally).42 Nietzsche compares these activities to dreaming, which he 
claims frees the dreamer from the fixed order of conceptual metaphors 
and unleashes an associative stream of new metaphors that he compares 
to the celebration of a Saturnalia.43 The creation of new metaphors libera-
tes:
Mit schöpferischem Behagen wirft er die Metaphern durcheinander und ver-
rückt die Gränzsteine der Abstraktion, so dass er z. B. den Strom als den be-
weglichen Weg bezeichnet, der den Menschen trägt, dorthin, wohin er sonst 
geht. Jetzt hat er das Zeichen der Dienstbarkeit von sich geworfen; sonst mit 
trübsinniger Geschäftigkeit bemüht, einen armen Individuum, dem es nach 
Dasein gelüstet, den Weg und die Werkzeuge zu zeigen und wie ein Diener für 
seinen Herrn auf Raub und Beute ausziehend ist er jetzt zum Herrn geworden 
und darf den Ausdruck der Bedürftigkeit aus seinen Mienen wegwischen. 
(With creative pleasure it throws metaphors into confusion and displaces the 
boundary stones of abstractions, so that, for example it designates the stream 
as »the moving path which carries man where he would otherwise walk.« The 
intellect has now thrown the token of bondage from itself. At other times it 
————
40  Ibid., 883. The English translation is found in BREAZEALE: 1999, 86.
41  See NIETZSCHE: 1988a, 886.
42  Ibid., 887. The English translation is in BREAZEALE: 1999, 89.
43  NIETZSCHE: 1988a, 886–887.
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endeavors, with gloomy officiousness, to show the way and to demonstrate the 
tools to a poor individual who covets existence; it is like a servant who goes in 
search of booty and prey for his master. But now it has become the master and 
it dares wipe from its face the expression of indigence).44
Nietzsche ended this essay by creating an opposition between »der 
vernünftige Mensch« (the man of reason) who lives by the ossified meta-
phor and »der intuitive Mensch« (the intuitive man) who creates with the 
metaphorical freedom described above. These two types were common 
elements in the oppositions that appear in Nietzsche’s work having ap-
peared earlier as the tragic and Socratic Greek and they would later ap-
pear in Zur Genealogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals) as 
representatives of the ascetic ideal and the nobility of prehistory respec-
tively. It is apparent that the poetic »I« in »Sundown at Sea« has inter-
nalized both positions and that the construction of metaphor in this 
poem, the tension between naming as a »Gleichsetzen des Nicht-Glei-
chen« (comparison of the unlike), as a means of mastering the ocean 
through the concepts of science is in a tense relationship with the desire 
to forget. It is here that we can understand that Strindberg, even in his 
most radical, almost absurd application of his understanding of natural-
ism bares the device of a collision between rational and irrational ele-
ments in the creation of his art.45 The metaphorical complex of the ocean 
is created from a perspective that has internalized this conflict. What I 
wish to take forward from Nietzsche’s early thoughts on the equation of 
the creation of new and transgressive metaphors with the overcoming of 
a position of servitude to the already created metaphors of the collective 
is that the creation of a new metaphor is the performative linguistic vehi-
cle for the active forgetting of the sovereign individual. For Nietzsche, it 
is by means of an active forgetting that the artist creates and resists the 
moralized judgment of the collective. 
 The last stanza of »Sundown at Sea« acts a condensation of the de-
scriptive movement in the poem and alerts us to the commonality be-
tween Nietzschean thought and Strindberg’s early poetic production. 
Here there is once again a movement from simile (Gleichnis) to meta-
phor. The poem ends: »Sweden lies like smoke/Like the smoke of a Ma-
————
44  Ibid., 888. The English translation is from BREAZEALE: 1999, 90.
45  In this sense, Strindberg is much less polemical and one-sided than Nietzsche in 
this moment. This also alerts us that the formal components of the commonality are 
much more pronounced than any commonality in content. 
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duro-Havanna,/And the sun sits over there/Like a half-extinguished 
cigar./But around the horizon/the cliffs stand so red/like Bengali-fire/and 
shine on the misery.«46 After the creation of the initial metaphorical 
complex where the collision of rational and irrational elements amalga-
mates into a sea of intoxication, the poetic voice depicts its collective 
origins. Sweden becomes evanescent, illuminated by the sun, but perceiv-
able only in this natural source of light’s reflection, which in a simile, is 
compared to an artificial source of light – fireworks, the light of the carni-
val. This light shines on the misery, »eländet« in the original Swedish. 
»Eländet,« »Elend« in German, according to one of Nietzsche’s numer-
ous etymologies in Zur Genealogie der Moral, has its origin in the word 
for exile, and is, according to Nietzsche, connected to the transgression 
of what binds a member to his community, the pledge to refrain from 
harmful and hostile acts.47
 We can now discern the complex that connects naming, forgetting, 
and origins in the poem and point out its Nietzschean commonality. For 
Nietzsche, mastery was dependent upon appropriation through naming. 
Naming, in turn, is dependent on the forgetting of the agonistic elements 
of origination. The Nietzschean genealogies are attempts to reactivate this 
conflict in order to linguistically re-appropriate the name for a thing in 
the present through a system of ranking. Metaphor can either be in an 
ossified state that masks its aspect, or through the activity of the sover-
eign individual, a means of separating oneself (through pathos, through 
suffering) from the moral valuation of the collective. 
 For both Nietzsche and Strindberg, metaphor was a means of over-
coming the constraints of their environment and a means of self-
overcoming. In »Sundown at Sea,« a metaphorical complex is created 
which performs the tension between naming and forgetting. In the last 
lines of the poem, the origin of collective values, Sweden, is connected to 
the notion of being a source of misery from which the poet is exiled for 
the crime of his metaphorical originality. The poem performs the move-
ment from likeness to substitution and highlights the tension between 
disparate elements in the formation of a description. This description in 
turn, is a form of overcoming the opposition of rational and irrational 
————
46  Please notice the movement here: There are four similes and an ending metaphor, 
the substitution of misery for Sweden. 
47  See NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 307, Zur Genealogie der Moral.
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elements through struggle while retaining both elements. This is the way 
that Strindbergian naturalism is compatible with Nietzschean philosophy. 
For in Strindberg’s naturalistic production, the text is a site of collision of 
rational and irrational elements. The struggle between these elements was 
then projected upon his society, as the origin of moral valuation, in the 
form of critique. 
Self-overcoming and the Pathos of Dual Origination
This leads us to a discussion of what I claimed was the underdeveloped 
concept in the environment of reception, origination. In the discussion of 
Nietzsche’s genealogical method, I claimed that the notion of dual origi-
nation was a springboard for the activity of Selbstüberwindung (self-
overcoming). This process depended on the internalization of an opposi-
tion between creative and reactive forces. I also posited that this opposi-
tion, between the ascetic ideal and the self-creating Herrschaft, was 
forwarded as a metaphorical explanation for the passage from a prehis-
torical to a historical state, and served as the contradictory raw material 
for self-construction in the text. This conflict between what Nietzsche 
calls the forces of the Vorzeit, that which comes before time and the 
forces whose internalization of their conditions have created historical 
consciousness is essential to our understanding of the notion of Selbst-
überwindung in its relation to the conflation of autobiography and his-
tory in the texts under consideration. 
Selsbstüberwindung is a process that utilizes the internal conflict 
between forces that have two distinctly different temporal qualities. 
Nietzsche believed that these forces are simultaneously present in the 
individual. The textual form of this temporal duality is genealogical po-
lemic. As early as his 1874 meditation, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der 
Historie für das Leben (On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History 
for Life), Nietzsche both criticized the domination of the historical sense 
in cultural life and understood its ineffable presence in human culture.48
Yet while Nietzsche was concerned with what he considered to be the 
enervating effect of an overabundance of concentration on the past, he 
never denied the validity of historical thinking in itself. 
————
48  See NIETZSCHE: 1988a, KSA 1, 243–324, Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie für 
das Leben. This essay is the second of the Unzeitgemäße Betrachtungen.
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 Nietzsche’s genealogical project, and in this I include Jenseits von 
Gut und Böse (Beyond Good and Evil) as the main text that the gene-
alogies explicate, was a response to the problem to what he saw as an 
overabundance of history. In Zur Genealogie der Moral, Nietzsche 
claimed that the social conditions of the Vorzeit were the result of a 
problem that nature set before man: the breeding of an animal that could 
make and keep promises.49 As this breeding was the cause of much suf-
fering or pathos, this suffering was turned inward by the animal that was 
bred. Thus, another way to understand Nietzsche’s re-construction of the 
origins of morality is that with the victory of the ascetic ideal and the 
advent of moral thinking, this originary pathos was obscured by a now 
prevailing ethos. In Nietzsche’s performative antidote to the insomnia 
that he attributes to an overabundance of historical thinking, der Wille 
zur Macht (the will to power), as an interpreting pathos struggles with 
the prevailing ethos. For in Nietzsche’s conception of a healthy historical 
sense, the ethos of shared moral valuation is subordinated to the pathos 
of interpretation. This helps to explain Nietzsche’s philosophy of history; 
der Wille zur Macht as the interpretive force of both self and world uses 
a genealogy as a vehicle for a reversal of the repression of pathos by 
ethos. This was his notion of an active nihilism, Nietzsche’s dangerous 
perhaps.
 Regarding temporal matters, Nietzsche’s attempted reversal of values 
does not point to the past. Instead it highlights the conflict between two 
orders, each of which has its own construction of temporality, each 
which has an anticipation of return. From this we can posit the following 
about Nietzsche’s conception of time and memory. First, Nietzsche did 
not see time as simply moving in a circle; instead, he posited two species 
of time in collision: the first is a linear historical time that is based on the 
inability to actively forget; this time is marked by ressentiment and the 
repression of pathos. Here, the past dominates and its anticipated return 
marks an eschatological moment with the possibility of salvation and 
resurrection. The second species of time is the circular time of the eternal 
return. This is not a metaphysical time, for Nietzsche had abandoned the 
notion of divine logos with his declaration of the death of God; it is a 
psychological time marked by differentiated repetition and Selbstüber-
————
49  See NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, Zur Genealogie der Moral. The discussion of this 
problem starts at the beginning of the »Zweite Abteilung« and can be found on pg. 291.
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windung. This is the time of Zarathustra’s »Vom Gesicht und Räthsel« 
where the two pathways that stretch on for eternity come together under 
a gateway over which is written »Augenblick«.50 These two species of 
time coexist and are in constant opposition in Nietzsche’s genealogical 
work. Linear time is the time of nihilism or decadence. Circular time is 
valorized as the time of health. It is also the time of Selbstüberwindung,
the time when elements of the past are addressed in the moment in order 
to create the metaphor of subjectivity. 
 This formula also informs the Nietzschean conception of memory. For 
Nietzsche there are two kinds of memory as well. The first type of mem-
ory is distinguished by an inability to digest experience. Nietzsche con-
sidered this to be an unhealthy state of affairs. This type of memory posits 
»I was therefore I am«. The second type of memory is a function of active
forgetting. This entails a discrete relationship between the lordly right to 
name and the recreation of a past that is dominated by the imperative of 
the moment. For Nietzsche, this dominant perspective that produces this 
type of interpretation is der Wille zur Gesundheit (the will to health). 
This type of memory says, »It was because ›I‹ will it to be such«. This also 
helps to explain why Nietzsche’s historical genealogy is a polemic against 
moral valuation as memory becomes a site of conflict between pathos and 
ethos, between individual re-construction through internal conflict and a 
collective understanding of the past where conflicts in valuation are re-
solved externally through an ossified metaphorical system: either the 
coming salvation as an absolute truth, or science or history as absolute 
teloi.
 It is my contention that Strindberg’s »autobiographical« project 
makes the same use of origins. Here, as in Nietzsche’s genealogical work, 
dual and agonistic origins are posited. The struggle between them is a war 
between two types of memory. This is the very struggle that Strindberg 
was later to call his befrielsekriget, his war of liberation. For it is in Tjän-
stekvinnans son (Son of A Servant) that the struggle between two orders 
of understanding experience, the naturalist order of environmental de-
termination and the hyper-present order of momentary affirmation, come 
into conflict. 
————
50  NIETZSCHE: 2002, KSA 4, Also sprach Zarathusthra 3. »Vom Gesicht und Räthsel« 
can be found on pp. 197–202, the parable about the »Augenblick« on pg. 200.
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Tjänstekvinnans son was written between 1885 and 1886. It was di-
vided into four volumes, each depicting a period of time in »en själs ut-
vecklingshistoria« (the history of the development of a soul). The first 
volume covers the period from 1849–1867; the second, entitled Jäsnings-
tiden (Time of Fermentation), tells the story of the years 1867–1872; the 
third volume, I Röda rummet (In the Red Room) narrates the »events« 
between 1872–1875; and the final volume, entitled Författaren (The Au-
thor), which was not published until 1909, is an account of the years 
between 1877 and 1887.51 The two missing years, 1875 and 1876, were the 
subject of Han och hon (He and She), a collection of letters between 
Strindberg and his first wife Siri von Essen that was refused by several 
publishers and did not reach the public until 1919, after Strindberg’s 
death.52 Han och hon shared the subtitle »en själs utvecklingshistoria«
with Tjänstekvinnans son and Strindberg had planned it to be included 
in the work. 
 In an excursus that follows the first chapter of this study, I discussed 
the relationship between Strindberg’s conception of a naturalist autobi-
ography and utilized the »interview« that he intended to preface the first 
volume of Tjänstekvinnans son. The fictional interviewee, the author,
stated in this interview that Tjänstekvinnans son »är ingen roman; det 
skall sålunda vara något nytt« (is not a novel, it would be, in that case, 
something new).53 He went on to explain the principle of a project that 
was to continue beside his literary production for the rest of his life. This 
project was a series of cross-referential »autobiographical« works of 
which Tjänstekvinnans son was the first installment. At the core of 
Strindberg’s conception of this project was the claim that one could only 
know one’s own life. The form of these naturalist autobiographies keeps 
this claim from degenerating into mere solipsism. This form, the geneal-
ogy of self, employs the oscillation between distance and proximity, re-
vealing itself as a self-referential hermeneutic with a weakened truth 
claim that is dependent upon the agonistic relationship between internal-
ized elements of necessity and contingency. I define necessity here as the 
linear time of history with its collective memory, and contingency as 
being the process of Selbstüberwindung through description. 
————
51  STRINDBERG: 1996a.
52  STRINDBERG: 1996b.
53  STRINDBERG: 1989, 372.
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 In Mitt förhållande till Nietzsche (My Relationship to Nietzsche), 
Strindberg claims with the writing of the fourth section of this text to 
have »arbetat mig ur äldre vantro, invuxen från ungdomen« (worked 
myself out of older false beliefs inherited from my youth).54 The first chap-
ter of the first volume of the work alerts us to the source of this »false 
belief«. It is my contention that the way this self-overcoming is performed 
is the heart of Strindberg’s commonality with Nietzsche. In order to illus-
trate this point, I will compare the description of origins in the first vol-
ume of the text with the meta-narrative commentary that closes the book 
in the fourth volume. I will now turn to the first volume, entitled simply, 
Tjänstekvinnans son (Son of a Servant).
Tjänstekvinnans son is narrated in the third person. It opens, in ex-
emplary naturalist fashion, by depicting the historical environment into 
which the protagonist, Johan, is born: 
Fyrtiotalet hade gått ut. Tredje ståndet som genom 1792 års revolution 
tillkämpat sig en del av människans rättigheter hade nu blivit påminnat om att 
det fanns ett fjärde och femte som ville fram. Svenska Bourgeoisien som hjälpt 
Gustav III att göra den kungliga revolten hade längesedan recipierat i 
överklassen under förre jakobinen Bernadottes stormästarskap, och hjälpt till 
att motväga adels- och ämbetsmannaståndet, vilka Karl Johan med sina 
underklass-instinkter hatade och vördade. Efter 48 års konvulsioner togs 
rörelsen om händer av den upplyste despoten, Oskar I, vilken insett 
evolutionens omotståndlighet och därför ville passa tillfället att få äran av 
reformernas genomförande. Han binder vid sig borgarskapet genom 
näringsfrihet och frihandel, med vissa inskränkningar naturligtvis, upptäcker 
kvinnans makt och beviljar systrar lika arvsrätt med bröder, utan att samtidigt 
lätta brödernas bördor såsom blivande familjeförsörjare. I borgarståndet finner 
hans regering stöd gentemot adeln med Hartmansdorff och emot prästerskapet 
vilka utgöra oppositionen 
(The forties had run their course. The third estate, which had won a share of 
human rights in the revolution of 1792, had now been reminded that there was 
a fourth and a fifth estate that also wanted to advance. The Swedish Bourgeoi-
sie, who had helped Gustav III in his royal revolt and had long since been ini-
tiated into the over-class during the former Jacobean, Bernadotte’s reign, now 
helped to balance the scales against the nobility and the bureaucracy, who Karl 
Johan with his underclass instincts both hated and admired. After the convul-
sions of ’48, this movement was appropriated by the enlightened despot, Oskar 
I, who realized that the evolution was irresistible, and as a result, wanted to 
take advantage of the opportunity to receive the credit for the enactment of the 
reforms. He binds the bourgeoisie to him through freedom of trade, with cer-
tain restrictions of course, discovers the power of women, and grants sisters 
equal rights of inheritance without simultaneously relieving the burden of their 
————
54  STRINDBERG: 1918, 323. My translation. 
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brother’s load as eventual breadwinners. His government finds its support in 
the bourgeoisie, and used them against the aristocracy with Hartmansdorff and 
against the clergy who makes up the opposition.)55
It is interesting, that Strindberg, the writer of his own history of Sweden, 
Svenska folket (1882), the man who attacked Gustav Geijer’s notion that 
»att det svenska folkets historia är dess konungars« (the history of the 
Swedish people is her kings),56 would open his own story with a cata-
logue of the political positions of three of Sweden’s more powerful kings. 
The narration continues with a description of the class structure, a de-
scription that extends architectonically, as the house into which Johan is 
born is divided along the very same class lines as society, the apartments 
being located along the lines of rank and distinction. These class divi-
sions of the social environment are even mirrored in Johan’s own biologi-
cal origins. 
 Johan’s father is described: »Han var en aristokrat av börd och av 
uppfostran.« (He was an aristocrat by virtue of lineage and upbringing.)57
His mother’s description, juxtaposed in the same paragraph to the fa-
ther’s, reads, »mor var fattig skräddardotter av en styvfar utsatt i livet som 
piga sedan som värdshusflicka« (mother was the daughter of a poor tailor 
who was sent out by her step father to be a maid and then a waitress).58
This dichotomy of being the son of an aristocrat and a servant is further 
developed as the father’s aristocratic bearing is set in relief against the 
mother’s »democratic instinct«. This opening sets a narrative in motion 
that is informed by the internalization of historical conditions and heredi-
tary factors. This certainly seems like a naturalist memoir. The protago-
nist’s historical environment and heredity are established as a starting 
point for an analysis of his development. His environment shapes him 
and his experience seems to be circumscribed by necessity. It also seems 
to be an internalization and anticipation of the anti-naturalist debates 
that accompanied the Nietzsche reception in the late 1880s. However, 
there is more to the story. 
 There is a split in the textual fabric. The protagonist Johan is an un-
veiled pseudonym narrated in the third person. August Johan Strindberg, 
————
55  STRINDBERG: 1989. My translation.
56. My translation. 
57  Ibid., 11.
58  Ibid. 
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the well-known public figure was designated as the author of the text. 
The name August Strindberg is inscribed upon the title page as the legal 
authority to which the text belongs. The narrator attributes the qualities 
and events that have marked »Strindberg’s« life to Johan. The proper 
name Johan is connected to a series of predicates that have already been 
publicly attributed to the proper name Strindberg. This protocol is ob-
served so strictly that the texts that have been legally attributed to Strind-
berg, published under his name and copyright, are attributed by the 
narrator to Johan in the third person within the confines of the text. This 
act gives Tjänstekvinnans son a dual characteristic. On the one hand, 
distance is taken through the use of a protagonist who stands in meta-
phorically for the name »Strindberg,« who speaks of his »I« as »he«. On 
the other hand, the text is so radically self-referential that the books, 
which Strindberg had written, are utilized to illustrate the development of 
the »fictional« protagonist. This strategy, at once a distancing through 
fictionalization and a making proximate through reference to the public 
utterances and legal status of the author, creates an oscillation between 
the very notions of the fictionality and the facticity of the past. This 
points to the relationship between the contingency of artistic creation 
and the necessity of environmental conditions that are forwarded in the 
text, and between the fixed aspects of the proper legal name and the vari-
ability of self-description. One can say that Strindberg assumes the right 
to name through the use of a pseudonymous stand-in for himself, and 
thereby claims the right for self-definition. He reappropriates aspects of 
his past through a reinscription of his name, as the stand-in, Johan, and 
thereby as metaphor. 
 This relationship is radicalized even further. In the fourth volume, in 
the last chapter entitled Tjänstekvinnans son (1886), the narrative is 
brought into the present tense and a metanarrative commentary is 
brought into play. The chapter itself describes aspects of the writing of 
the book of which it is a part. This chapter can be divided into two sec-
tions. The first section comments on the writing of Tjänstekvinnans son 
(Son of a Servant) and the writing begins by conjugating verbs in the past 
tense only to break into a discussion of subjectivity that shifts tenses, the 
verbs conjugated in the present. This second part of the chapter consists 
of a dialogue between Johan and a character designated only as X. It is 
here that the radical hermeneutic structure of the text is brought home 
and internalized within the text itself, as it comments upon itself. This 
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chapter that bears the name of the text is a commentary upon the writing 
of itself. It takes the same distance that Strindberg takes to Johan and it 
enjoys the same proximity as well. It is even more interesting that the 
narrator states that the book was written because of a decision to
göra upp bokslut med det gamla, genomgå sitt livs händelser från början till 
dato, undersöka sin själs uppkomst – och utvecklingshistoria, sådan densamma 
uppstått under alla framverkande orsaker av ärftlighet, uppfostran, naturell, 
temperament, under tryck och inverkan av den givna historiska epokens yttre 
händelser och andliga rörelser. 
(close the books on the old, go through his life’s events from beginning to the 
date, examine his soul’s origination – and developmental history, such as it 
arose under all the pre-existing conditions of inheritance, nature, tempera-
ment, under the pressure and influence of the given historical epoch’s external 
events and spiritual movements.)59
On the surface this appears to be a laundry list of a naturalist’s under-
standing of the relationship between a historical environment and the 
possibilities for the development of the individual under those circum-
stances. Considering that Strindberg radicalized his own conception of 
naturalism to the point where only self-understanding was deemed possi-
ble, it is certainly no surprise that there would be a conflation of autobi-
ography and history in this text. It could be argued that Strindberg’s 
innovation was to give the naturalist protagonist a self-conscious under-
standing of the effect of environment on the individual by turning the 
vivisecting scalpel on himself, no more and no less. If this is so, then 
there is at best a weak commonality with Nietzsche, who despite his own 
predilection for positing environmental factors as determinant was cer-
tainly not a naturalist.60
 However, despite its »naturalistic« surface, there are two orders of 
time and two orders of memory present in Tjänstekvinnans son (Son of 
a Servant). The first order of time is the linear time of naturalist depic-
tion. This is particularly manifested in the first three volumes. It is here 
————
59  STRINDBERG: 1996a, 214. My translation. 
60  Or perhaps he was a »naturalist« in the same sense as Strindberg. In other words, a 
type of dialectical naturalist, one who recognized that self-interpretation was subject to 
historical factors, but introduced a radical element of contingency into the mix. In any 
case, Strindberg’s »naturalism« is certainly eccentric and Nietzsche’s anti-naturalistic 
position does not deny the effect of hereditary, social, historical, or even geographical 
conditions on the development of the subject. Certainly, both men’s positions on natu-
ralism are more polemical than substantial. As illustrated throughout this study, this is 
most often the case in late nineteenth century letters. 
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that environmental conditions dominate the individual. The second order 
of time is the circular time of differentiated repetition. This is the time of 
the last chapter of the fourth volume. It is here that the dual origins of 
Johan’s conception are overcome and a hierarchy is established. It is here 
that autobiographical excavation is transformed into a performative act in 
the moment. This performative act is initiated in the metanarrative com-
mentary.
 The metanarrative commentary goes on to state that the text is neither 
a confession nor is it a memoir.61 This leads us to a question: what is Tjänste-
kvinnans son? My answer is that it is a genealogy of self, a Selbstüber-
windung, a performative work that overcomes the dual origins of its 
author and establishes an internal hierarchy. Strindberg performs his 
Selbstüberwindung in the following manner. The title, Tjänstekvinnans
son (Son of a Servant), is misleading for it implies that the subject of the 
book is defined by his relationship to his mother’s position (»als meine 
Mutter lebe ich noch und werde alt« (as my mother I still live and grow 
old)).62 Almost immediately, dual origins are posited. The title has three 
textual valences: it is an expression of one of the temporal orders in the 
text, the representation of a movement away from a point of origin, and 
at the same time a symbol of the retention of a contradictory internal life 
(»als mein Vater bereits gestorben« (as my father I am already dead)).63
The protagonist is the son of two discrete and incompatible positions, as 
his father’s aristocratic nature is sharply contrasted with his mother’s 
»lower-class« origins. 
 These dual origins are not in a stable relationship to each other, but 
rather like Nietzsche’s competing perspectives, their relationship collides 
internally. They are the raw material with which Johan (»Strindberg«) 
constructs a complex metaphor to stand in for the self. The process of 
self-construction that is dependent on contradiction is brought home in 
the metanarrative commentary in the last chapter. The title of the chapter, 
Tjänstekvinnans son (1886), represents the circular order of time and is a 
————
61  STRINDBERG: 1996a, 214: »Detta var huvudsyftet med boken om Tjänstekvinnans 
son, och alls icke att skriva några bekännelser, for att ursäkta sig, eller några memoarer 
för att roa.« My translation: »This was the main goal of the book about the son of a 
servant, and the goal was not at all to write some confessions to ask for pardon, nor to 
write a memoir to entertain.« 
62  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, KSA 6, 264.
63  Ibid. 
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differentiated repetition. For it is here that the narrative enters the pre-
sent, becomes a polemic, the right to name is asserted, and the genea-
logical exploration of origins ends with a truth claim that is contingent 
upon an organizing idea and opposed to a telos. The issue of the shifting 
metaphors of self and their temporality has been addressed. I will treat 
each of the remaining claims in turn, starting with a discussion of the 
relationship between the act of presenting (making contemporary) and 
the polemical voice. 
Fick han då fatt på sitt jag under denna långa och trista vandring i minnenas 
skuggrike? Att svara nej, skulle förr ha gjort honom bryderi, ty en personlig 
gud fordrar en ansvarig personlighet, men nu bryr det honom mindre, då han 
vet att jaget är en mycket bräcklig form av en liten rörelse varande kvantitet 
kraft, eller materia om man hellre vill, som under de givna förhållandena 
utvecklar sig så och så. 
(Did he get a grasp on his I during that long, gloomy meander in memory’s 
shadowy realm? Before, an answer of no would have embarrassed him, for a 
personal God demands an accountable personality; but now he cares less for 
he knows that the I (ego) is a very fragile form of a small quantity of existing 
force or material in motion, if one prefers, that under such and such given rela-
tionships develops one way or the other.)64
The narrative changes its verb tenses at the moment of a discussion of the 
construction of the »I«. It is in this moment that the narrative takes on a 
polemical voice as it both addresses Johan’s own past as a contemporary 
and implicitly attacks the internalization of his mother’s religious posi-
tion through a denial of the existence of a personal God who would 
demand responsibility in the form of a stable character. It is in this mo-
ment, directly after the denial of God’s existence, that the tenses change. 
It is in this moment as well, that the »I« is dismissed as a construction, as 
it said to be a quantity of force or material if »if one prefers«. 
 The metadiscourse then turns to the subject of the book’s conclusion. 
The narrator addresses an imaginary interlocutor who demands a »sam-
manfattning,« a recapitulation or summary conclusion. The narrator 
responds to his own question by stating: 
Men resultatet, sammanfattningen? frågar man. Var ligger sanningen han 
sökte? Den ligger här och där i de tusen tryckta sidorna; sök upp dem, samla 
dem och se efter om de kunna sammanfattas; se efter om de äro giltiga längre 
än ett år, fem år, tänk efter om de ens ha utsikt att bli giltiga, då därtill fordras 
ett flertals erkännande. Och glöm inte att sanningen icke kan finnas emedan 
den befinner sig som allt i beständig utveckling. 
————
64  STRINDBERG: 1996a, 214. My translation. 
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(But the conclusion, the summary, one asks? Where does the truth he sought 
reside? It resides here and there in the thousand printed pages; look them up, 
collect them and see if they could be summarized or concluded; see if they are 
valid longer than a year, five years, think about if they even have the intention 
to be valid, for that would have demanded many admissions. And don’t forget 
that the truth does not exist since it finds itself, like everything else, in constant 
development.) 65
There is no recapitulation. There is no summary. There is only a continu-
ous becoming with a dynamically unstable truth claim. The imaginary 
interlocutor is told to look at the text itself, and to the texts that the text 
discusses; all attributed to one August Strindberg and also to his double, 
Johan the protagonist. Any conclusion is of the moment, which is the 
time of the recurrence of the past, continually the same and continually 
new, always in a state of becoming (i beständig utveckling). There is no 
truth to Tjänstekvinnans son (Son of a Servant), there is only a self-
referential narrative that demands an immanent interpretation of the texts 
of August Strindberg. The narrator names his »truth« and it is the »truth« 
of the fluidity of the past as it is organized and re-organized under the 
imperative of the moment. The narrator implicitly claims the right to 
name his own truth and the name of his truth is Johan, the character who 
has textually relived August Strindberg’s life. There is no telos, only a 
metaphorical »I« that stands in for the constant change. The »I« is the 
deck of a ship on the open sea, from which the narrator describes his 
perspective. But the »I« is also a »he« for Strindberg. He/I is Johan. 
 Thereby, Johan is a split metaphor. He is the Johan who represents the 
trajectory of the linear order of time and memory, subjected to the his-
torical conditions that have shaped his environment and the inheritance 
of his parents, who, in turn, represent conflicting aspects that have been 
internalized. This is the Johan determined by an interpretation called ne-
cessity. There is also the Johan who is merely the proper name that stands 
in for the performance of a genealogy of self, the fictional »doer« of the 
deed of Selbstüberwindung. This moment is also present in the last chap-
ter, the chapter of the present tense. This is the Johan of contingency. 
————
65  Ibid., 215.
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 The last section of Tjänstekvinnans son is a dialog between Johan 
and X.66 They are discussing politics. X is a young Swedish aristocrat. The 
dialog begins: 
– Det förefaller mig, började X, som din monomani att vilja vara demokrat 
strede emot något att du ej rår på. 
– Jag vet inte, svarar Johan, men det synes mig, när jag själv läser boken, såsom 
om ett samvete förföljde mig. 
X. – Vad är samvete? 
Johan – Fruktan för följderna, säger man numera; känslan av att man ha gjort 
orätt, sa man förr. 
X. – Orätt, rätt? Du har genom uppfostran och naturliga anlag stigit över den 
klass, där du var född; du är icke mer underklass du kallar, utan överklass. 
Varför generar du dig? Känner du kanske motsägelsen i dina angrepp på 
överklassen, och känner du att du angripa dig själv i dina skrifter? Du är 
gammaldags i det stycket, och det är bara kristendom med försakelselära som 
du ej kan frigjöra dig ifrån. 
Johan. – Ja, men det kan också vara mina medfödda klasskänslor som ej 
kunnat följa med i utvecklingen …« 
(– It occurs to me, X began, that your monomania about wanting to be a de-
mocrat conflicts with something that you are not able to overcome. 
– I don’t know, answers Johan, but it is evident to me when I read the book 
myself that it is as if a conscience persecuted me. 
X. – What is conscience? 
Johan. – Fear of consequences, people say nowadays. People used to say that it 
is the feeling of having done something wrong. 
X. – Wrong, right? You have risen above the class that you were born into by 
virtue of your upbringing and natural proclivities. You are not underclass, 
rather you are overclass. Why bother yourself? Do you even see the contradic-
tion in your attack on the overclass, and do you not know that you attack 
yourself in your writings? You are old-fashioned in that way, and it is only that 
you cannot free yourself from Christianity with its ascetic teachings. 
Johan. – Yes, but that can also be my inherited class feelings that could not 
keep pace with the development …)67
There are several things to note about this exchange. First is the form, 
that of a dialogue between an aristocrat and the son of a servant. Second 
is the relationship of form and content. The two are discussing the split in 
Johan, his internalized guilt, his rise above his class, the contradictions of 
self-critique in his production, and the elements of his birth that he can-
————
66  Biographical readings of Tjänstekvinnans son have identified X as Verner von Hei-
denstam and all evidence points in his direction. However, for my purposes, X is a textual 
location, a participant in a split in the narration, an indication of the struggle of Johan's 
emergence from being the son of a servant, and a trope in Strindberg’s »befrielsekrig«. 
67  STRINDBERG: 1996a, 218–219.
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not escape. There is a struggle between the two orders in this dialogue; 
the necessity of inheritance is confronted by the contradictions created by 
Johan’s overcoming of his origins. The dialogue is in the form of a debate, 
X as an element of the text is the manifestation of the struggle between the 
son of a servant and an aristocrat. He plays the role of the organizing idea.
 The text ends with a performative moment. X urges Johan to write 
down their conversation if he dares. Johan replies: »Ja det ska jag göra 
[…] och det ska bli slutet på fjärde delen av Tjänstekvinnans son.« (I 
will do that […] and that will be the end of the fourth part of Son of a 
Servant.)68 Considering that Strindberg was later to call the writing of 
this volume his war of liberation and in many ways began to assume X.’s 
convictions,69 there is a doubleness to this statement. On the one hand, it 
draws the text into the moment in a radical temporal shift that equates 
the close of the book with the ending of the act of writing. The performa-
tivity of this act resides in the confluence of memory and the moment of 
writing, thereby highlighting the differentiated repetition that governs the 
form of the genealogy of self. It reflects the subordination of content to 
formal considerations. Second, in this volume this act marks the emer-
gence of the Johan that is no longer tjänstekvinnans son, no longer only 
the son of a servant, but rather an aristocrat by virtue of self-overcoming, 
which subordinates the son of a servant through the tyranny of the orga-
nizing idea. It is as if he were saying what Nietzsche was to say later in 
Ecce Homo: »Wohlan, ich bin das Gegenstück eines décadent: denn ich 
beschrieb eben mich.« (Well then, I am the opposite of a decadent, be-
cause I have just described myself.)70 In an act of performative irony, 
Tjänstekvinnans son (Son of a Servant) is no longer a fitting title and 
Strindberg has written himself out of his »false belief«. The problem of 
overcoming dual origins was for both Nietzsche and Strindberg an aes-
thetic process in which an internalized social structure and hereditary 
disposition are overcome by a selection process that creates a fictional 
»doer« for the »deed« of a polemical genealogy. In both cases, the act of 
de-scription enables a re-inscription of a momentary metaphor that 
————
68  Ibid., 229.
69  By early 1887, Strindberg had renounced many of his former political views. He would 
return to socialism, democracy, and Christianity after his Inferno crisis in the late 1890s.
70  NIETZSCHE: 1988d, 267. See NORMAN: 2005, 77 for the English translation. 
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stands in the place of the subject. This is the commonality in the two 
men’s authorial projects, what Strindberg called the systemless system. 
By the Open Sea: Strindberg’s Nietzschean Experiment 
Let us return for a moment to Strindberg’s open sea. The novel I havs-
bandet (By the Open Sea) (1890) was said by Strindberg to be a fictional 
experiment with Nietzsche’s philosophy. Commentators have often 
pointed to this novel in order to underscore their point that Strindberg 
misread Nietzsche. They designate the protagonist, Axel Borg, as Strind-
berg’s version of der Übermensch (the overman). The Norwegian, Harald 
Beyer, comments that Borg is hardly a Nietzschean figure due to his re-
fined and sensitive nature. Beyer uses the term intelligensaristokrat to 
describe the Strindbergian version of this Nietzschean figure.71 I would 
like to conclude this chapter by pointing out that perhaps Beyer read 
Strindberg’s novel in too programmatic a fashion and that By the Open 
Sea comments upon Nietzsche in a way that remains unexplored. 
 Strindberg included a map of his production in the preface to the 
fourth volume of The Son of a Servant. Written by Strindberg retrospec-
tively in 1909, the preface includes a chart that schematically lists his 
writings and places them into categories. On the second page of this chart 
one can read: 
I havsbandet. Nietzsches Filosofi influerar; men Individen går under i strävan 
till den absoluta Individualismen. Inleder 90-talet: Übermensch. 
(By the Open Sea. Nietzsche’s philosophy influences; but the individual suc-
cumbs (goes under) in the striving for absolute individuality. Introduces the 
90’s: Übermensch.)72
This lone paragraph has greatly inflected scholars’ understanding of two 
aspects of Strindberg’s encounter with Nietzsche. First, it has contributed 
to a concentration on the question of influence and has delimited the 
texts that have been brought under scrutiny. Second, it has led to a read-
ing of By the Open Sea that concludes that Axel Borg’s final act is sui-
cide. I offer an alternative reading. 
————
71  See BEYER: 1958, 50–63. See also Eklund: 1948: 414.
72  STRINDBERG: 1996a. This preface can be found in the appendix on pp. 263–267. Our 
citation can be found on pg. 265. My translation. 
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 First, Strindberg’s retrospective self-analysis claims that the individual 
perishes in the attempt for an absolute individuality. At the time of this 
novel’s composition, a form of self-construction that was dependent upon 
contradiction governed Strindberg’s conception of individuality. He un-
derstood these contradictions as arising from description (self or other-
wise), which he understood as creating a locus where the collision 
between irrational and rational forces becomes apparent. This is quite 
apparent in the novel, where the demise of the individual indicates a 
possibility for a beginning as well as an end. 
 If Johan, in Tjänstekvinnans son had overcome the doubleness of his 
heredity, Axel Borg is a motherless child. The protagonist does not carry 
the burden of a dual inheritance. Instead he carries the expectations of a 
father who represents the idea of generational progression that is passed 
on to his son. This idea is carried by Borg, and his understanding of it in 
vulgar Darwinian terms, as the survival of the fittest, is severely tested as 
the novel progresses. There are two other arenas of contention, one ex-
ternal and the other internal. The prominent external struggle in this 
novel plays out through Borg’s relationship to the inhabitants of the 
skerry. The internal struggle is between science and desire, or knowledge 
and love. 
 On the surface, Borg wears the aspect of the Übermensch as an intel-
ligensaristokrat. He has a clearly »superior« understanding, and even 
attempts to establish religion on the island as a means of organizing what 
he considers to be the herd. Strindberg certainly conducts an experiment 
with his understanding of Nietzsche’s philosophy in that the text implic-
itly asks the question: is it possible for such a figure as Borg to thrive in 
the company of other humans? His answer is seemingly in the negative as 
Borg eventually becomes so isolated that he breaks down and despite his 
desire to do so, he cannot reproduce himself as he loses his chance at 
love due to his need to conquer. In the end he even tries unsuccessfully 
to reproduce life in his laboratory. His drive to reproduce comes to a 
head in a pathetic scene where Borg collects some dolls that have washed 
up on the shore and tries to raise them as his children. On the level of 
content, seen through the optic of influence, Beyer appears to be correct; 
if Strindberg did depict Borg as an Übermensch, then his experiment 
came to the conclusion that Nietzsche’s philosophy is untenable in the 
real world. However, if Borg’s last act is read through a different optic, 
another possible conclusion emerges. 
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 The scholarship that sees the encounter from the perspective of influ-
ence has been dependent on a direct mapping of a reading of Nietzsche’s 
philosophy onto Strindberg’s work. Limited by an insistence on assessing 
Strindberg’s fidelity to the more underdeveloped and polemical aspects of 
the Nietzschean corpus, such as the notions of origination and the 
Übermensch, it has attempted to understand Borg as a type of miscreant 
Übermensch, and as a result, neglected to pay heed to the development 
of the ocean as metaphor in the novel. This has caused a negative reading 
of Nietzsche’s influence, and the conclusion that there is a misreading 
and a rejection of the philosopher on Strindberg’s part. 
 I approach this novel from a different perspective. First, if the descrip-
tion of the ocean is taken into account, Borg is not an Übermensch, but 
more likely an example of der höheren Menschen in Also sprach 
Zarathustra or the scientific nihilist of Zur Genealogie der Moral. If this 
is the case, then even on the level of content, the ending of the novel 
takes on quite a different valence and the description of the novel in the 
1909 preface to the fourth volume of Tjänstekvinnans son can be read to 
mean that the decade of the 1890s was the start of an experiment with the 
Übermensch. Seen on the level of both form and content, By the Open 
Sea does not demarcate the end of a period of commonality in the au-
thorships, but serves as a signpost that points to a further investigation of 
the implications of Strindberg and Nietzsche’s understanding of the di-
lemma of subject formation in a world abandoned by God.
 There are three issues to be addressed regarding the description of the 
ocean in the novel: Borg’s perspective in relation to the object of descrip-
tion, the components of the description, and the relation of the descrip-
tion to the end of the novel. It is certainly meaningful that the narration is 
in the third person and that Borg is depicted from this distance. However, 
my treatment of Borg’s perspective is justified by the focalization of na-
ture descriptions through his eyes. The components of the description 
inform us about the dynamics of this perspective. The first two points of 
analysis bring new light to the meaning of the book’s conclusion. 
 Borg’s perspective is established from the outset. The text opens with 
Borg traveling as a passenger in a rowboat to the skerry where he is to 
serve as fishing Inspector. One of the inhabitants of the island, »Tullkar-
len« (The Customs Man), is rowing the boat. Borg’s is described in detail 
and three aspects of his appearance are of note. He dresses in the manner 
of a decadent, he is regarded as an exotic outsider by »Tullkarlen,« and 
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he is wearing »ett tjockt guldarmband i form av en orm som bet sig i 
stjärten« (a thick bracelet in the form of a snake that bit itself in the 
tail).73 Borg is dressed inappropriately for his rather rough surroundings, 
his companion regards him with disdain, and he bears the symbol of the 
Uroborous. There is split in Borg’s appearance that signifies his perspec-
tive: this highly cultivated individual is also a figure of the realm of the 
circular self-referential cycle represented by his bracelet, a self-enclosed 
cycle of birth and death. Borg is described as a confluence of culture and 
irrational cyclical repetition. 
 A violent storm arises and events confirm the description of Borg as 
an amalgam of scientific and irrational elements. The purely instinctive 
»Tullkarlen« is unable to navigate through the violence of the storm, so 
Borg takes the helm and his performance delineates his perspective on 
nature. Borg is both the man of instinct and the man of science: 
det var såsom om han improviserat nautiska och meteorologiska instrument av 
sina känsliga sinnen till vilka ledningar stodo öppna från hans stora 
hjärnbatteri som doldes av den lilla löjliga hatten och den svarta hundluggen. 
(it was as if he were improvising nautical and meteorological instruments from 
his delicate senses, to which the cords passed freely from his large brain-
battery, concealed behind the little hat and the black dog’s bangs).74
Borg’s thinking is compared to the functioning of scientific instruments. 
There is a conflation of his instincts and his knowledge. He brings the 
boat safely to shore and collapses. He is both the instinctive man who 
understands the ocean’s »harmonilära,«75 and he is the scientific man 
who takes his distance from the fury of the storm to guide the boat to 
safety. When his task is completed, he collapses. Like the swimmer in 
»Haze,« Borg had pitted his own will against that of the ocean and the 
end result was a loss of consciousness. However, there is a significant 
difference between the two depictions. Borg did not immerse himself in 
the ocean in search of a merger with a natural force, instead he oscillated 
between the proximity of an instinctive reading of the text of the ocean 
and the distancing engendered by the internalization of science. This 
conflation delineates Borg’s initial perspective. 
————
73  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 7.
74  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 12. Translation taken from SANDBACH: 1987, 6.
75  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 12. Translation: »harmony-teaching«. 
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 However, the descriptions of the ocean in the novel, as focalized 
through Borg, play on the notion of science as hubris and are not neces-
sarily a valorization of Borg as an intelligens aristocrat. The narrative 
develops a complex of descriptive events to illustrate this point. Borg sees 
himself as the crown of creation. »Intendent Borg var ingen naturdyrkare, 
lika litet som indiern dyrkade naveln, tvärtom hyste han såsom 
självmedveten och stående högst i den telluriska skapelsekedjan, en viss 
ringaktning för lägre existensformer.« (Inspector Borg did not worship 
nature any more than the Indian worshipped his navel. On the contrary, 
as a being conscious of himself, and of standing highest in the chain of 
terrestrial creations, he entertained a certain contempt for lower forms of 
existence.)76 This attitude emerges from the descriptions of the ocean 
focalized through Borg’s perspective by means of indirect discourse. 
Det var icke med poetens drömfantasi med de dunkla och därför oroande 
känslorna och orediga förnimmelserna betraktaren njöt av det stora 
skådespelet utan det var med forskarens, den vakne tänkarens lugna blickar 
han överskådade sammanhanget i denna skenbara oreda, och det var endast 
genom sitt hopade väldiga material av minnen han kunde sätta alla dessa 
åskådade föremål i förbindelse med varandra. 
(It was not with the dream-like imagination of the poet, or with vague and 
consequently disturbing emotions and confused perceptions that the beholder 
enjoyed this great spectacle. No, it was with the calm eyes of the scholar and 
conscious thinker that he detected order behind this apparent disorder. He 
was able [only] with the great store of accumulated memories to arrange all his 
observations in relation to each other.)77
This description of natural life that follows obeys a progressive line of 
development, and things are described by virtue of their age: »avsvalnings-
periodens alger« (algae of the cooling-off period), »den äldsta avkom-
lingen sillen« (their oldest descendent, the herring), »stenkolstidens orm-
bunkar« (club-mosses of the Carboniferous era), »sekundärtidens barrträd« 
(coniferous trees […] of the secondary era), and »tertiärtidens lovträd« 
(deciduous trees […] of the Tertiary era) and so on.78 All living things are 
described by their position in a chain of development in a schema that 
despite its attention to rank and order is more Darwinian than 
Nietzschean. Borg goes on to classify human beings in the same manner. 
————
76  Ibid., 25. Translation: SANDBACH: 1987, 20.
77  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 34. Translation in SANDBACH: 1987, 29.
78  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 35. Translation SANDBACH: 1987, 30.
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Borg is depicted not as an Übermensch, but as der höhere Mensch (the
higher man) in Also Sprach Zarathustra, or the scientist of Zur Gene-
alogie der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals).
 As the novel progresses the duality in Borg’s perspective becomes 
more apparent. He continues to seek nature through a scientific optic, 
but wears his bracelet as a talisman whenever he needs to rely upon his 
instincts. This represents a confluence of rational and irrational elements 
in Borg’s person, and the descriptions illustrate a repression of instinctive 
elements that accompanies Borg's conscious attempt to subordinate na-
ture to a scientific order of naming. This is especially apparent in two 
moments. The first moment is the creation of an optical illusion designed 
to show the inhabitants of the island the power of science. Borg loses 
control over his creation as two suns appear in the sky and the supersti-
tious islanders understand the scene to portend the coming of the apoca-
lypse.79 His control is incomplete, and he learns that nature cannot be 
controlled by calculation. His attempt to master nature parallels his at-
tempt to master the population of the island through science alone. Both 
end in a dismal failure as »[h]an hade lekt med naturandarne, frambes-
vurit en fiende till hjälpa sig som han trodde och då hade alla gått över till 
fienden så att han nu stod ensam« ([h]e had played with the spirits of 
nature, he had conjured up an enemy to help him, as he thought, and 
now everything had gone the enemy’s way and he walked alone).80 This 
passage is crucial to an understanding of the novel for as Borg, forgetting 
the ocean’s »harmonilära,« masters neither the natural environment nor 
human relations. He becomes more and more isolated and eventually his 
reason in the extreme crosses over to madness. His relationship with 
Maria follows along similar lines. He eventually »masters« her, but winds 
up alone. 
 The depiction of Borg’s degeneration has its parallel in the progres-
sion of the dominance of scientific thinking in his descriptions. The story 
of Borg’s visit to the island is not a representation of the failure of an 
Übermensch to establish control over his environment. Rather, it is a 
narrative that leads to a »genealogical« moment at the novel’s conclu-
sion. At the end of the novel, Borg once again sets out to sea. This time 
he is alone and he is leaving the island. It is Christmas Eve, and he sees a 
————
79  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 117
80  Ibid., 118. Translation, SANDBACH: 1987, 117.
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star in the sky. At first, he thinks that it is »ledstjärnan till Betlehem« (the 
lodestar to Bethlehem) and a criticism of Christianity as occasioning 
»fallna storheter« (fallen heroes) for the benefit of »alla smås förklarade 
gud« (the avowed God of all the small).81 He then realizes that he is mis-
taken. The star is »Beta i Herkules«. Borg sets his course: 
Ut mot den åtminstone på himmelen upptagne, som aldrig lät piska sig eller 
spotta sig i ansiktet utan att som en man slå och spotta tillbaka, ut mot själv-
förbrännaren som endast kunde falla för sin egen starka hand utan att tigga om 
nåd från kalken, mot Herakles, som befriade Prometheus, ljusbringaren, själv 
son av en gud, och en kvinnomoder, som sedan vildarne förfalskat till en 
jungfrupilt, vars födelse hälsades av mjölkdrickande herdar och skriande 
åsnor. Ut mot den nya julstjärna gick färden, ut över havet, allmodern, ur vars 
sköte livets första gnista tändes, fruktsamhetens, kärlekens outtömliga brunn, 
livets urpsrung och livets fiender. 
(Out towards the one whom at least the heavens had received. The one who 
had never allowed himself to be whipped or spat in the face without, like a 
man, hitting and spitting back. Out towards the one who had burnt himself, 
who could only die from his own strong hand, without begging for grace from 
the chalice. Out to Heracles who had [freed] Prometheus, the bringer of light, 
himself the son of a god and a human mother, though the barbarians later mis-
represented him as a virgin boy, whose birth was celebrated by milk-drinking 
shepherds and braying asses. He had steered his course out towards the new 
Christmas star, out over the sea, the mother of all, in whose womb the first 
spark of life was lit, the inexhaustible well of fertility and love, life’s source and 
life’s enemy.)82
 Borg sets his course for the star of Hercules and the ocean takes on a 
new aspect. The description is now poetic, and the ocean becomes a 
source of love, life, and suffering. There is an opposition created in the 
tension between the description of the star and the description of the 
ocean. The star, »den nya julstjärnan« (the new Christmas star) becomes 
a symbol of Borg’s decision to replace the light of Christianity with Hera-
cles, who enabled Prometheus to bring light to the human race. If Prome-
theus can be seen as a bringer of culture, he is also a symbol of suffering 
as he was forced to endure torture throughout eternity. The ocean be-
comes a vitalistic symbol, dark, uncertain, fruitful, a source of love and 
death. Borg is traveling towards the beacon of culture creation on a sea of 
————
81  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 182. Translation: The first and third translations are from 
SANDBACH: 1987, 184. The second translation is mine. 
82  STRINDBERG: 1982b, 183. Translation: SANDBACH: 1987, 184–185. I made one amend-
ment that is indicated by brackets. Sandbach translated the Swedish »befriade« as 
»bred«. This is incorrect; it translates to »freed«. 
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incalculable and cyclical repetition. Rather than committing suicide, Borg 
is sailing on a body of water that is a union of the necessity of recurrence 
and the contingency of possibility. He has given up his rational evolu-
tionary thinking and now valorizes a source as opposed to the crown in a 
chain of progression. His previous mode of description, exemplary in its 
inability to forget that which has been learned and exemplary in its for-
getting of the metaphorical nature of its scientific postulations, has now 
turned to the creation of a metaphor that transgresses against Christian 
belief. Borg has set sail for the open sea. He has paused before the deci-
sion. In a state of endless becoming, in the guise of the »good European« 
to come, he has paused before being.83
 Borg’s final journey does not mark a final capitulation nor is it a sui-
cide in the sense of finality. It is genealogical moment where the twin 
lodestars of European culture are set against the horizon as Borg sails out 
to the open sea. On the surface, he understands his possibilities to be 
between Christ and Hercules, but as we shall see, there is no choice at all, 
for both are present within. This moment of decision does not mark the 
end of Strindberg’s fictional enactment of Nietzschean possibilities; it 
marks the beginning of a Promethean stage in Strindberg’s understanding 
that culminated in his Inferno crisis. It is during that time period that the 
repressed elements, the path not chosen re-emerges. However, before we 
turn to our concluding chapter, it would be wise to remember that 
Strindberg, who ends his Nietzschean novel with Borg on the open sea, 
wrote to Nietzsche on December 31st of 1888. In this letter, he cites Horace 
and the English translation reads as follows: 
You would lead a better life, Licinius, if you neither shaped your life constantly 
towards the open sea, nor, shivering tremulously in the face of the storm, held 
too closely to the treacherous coast. 
————
83  Recall that Strindberg owned a copy of Nietzsche’s Jenseits von Gut und Böse 
(Beyond Good and Evil), and in the margin next to Aphorism 243 he wrote the word 
»framåt« or »forward«. The aphorism reads: »Ich höre mit Vergnügen, dass unsre Son-
ne in rascher Bewegung gegen das Sternbild des Herkules hin begriffen ist: und ich 
hoffe, dass der Mensch auf dieser Erde es darin der Sonne gleich thut. Und wir voran, 
wir guten Europäer!« (I’m glad to hear that our sun is moving rapidly towards the con-
stellation of Hercules: and I hope that the people of this earth will act like the sun. With 
us in front, we good Europeans!) See NIETZSCHE: 1993, KSA 5, 183. The translation 
comes from NORMAN: 2005, 134.
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Apparently Strindberg, unable to conceive of a harbor for being on the 
shores of the ocean’s incessant becoming, could not follow this advice 
himself. Neither was Nietzsche able to affect such moderation. With this 
in mind, I will conclude with an examination of what these two thinkers 
have to say to us today. 
